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Abstract: 
The new regulatory environment triggered by MiFID has resulted in a transformed 
competitive landscape and increased fragmentation among execution venues in Europe. One 
key component of MiFID is best execution, i.e. investment firms are obliged to achieve the 
best result for customer orders on a consistent basis. Specifically for retail transactions, the 
total consideration, i.e. price and explicit transaction costs, shall apply as a benchmark for the 
best result. In contrary to RegNMS, MiFID does not require to achieve the best result based 
on a real-time comparison of available prices. Therefore, after the introduction of MiFID the 
question on the extent of suboptimal order executions after transaction costs arises. Applying 
order book data for EURO STOXX 50 securities of ten European execution venues, this paper 
analyses suboptimal order executions including transaction costs by simulating an optimal 
Smart Order Routing engine. The results show that after explicit transaction costs, specifically 
cross-system settlement costs, still an economically relevant number of suboptimal order 
executions prevails. The developed methodology and parameters enable for assessing and 
future tracking of the efficiency of order execution in European equity markets and the 
effectiveness of regulatory measures both on the trading level, e.g. MiFID, or on the post-
trading level, e.g. the Code of Conduct for Clearing and Settlement.  
 
 
JEL Classification: G14, G15, G24   2 
1 Introduction 
In fragmented markets the real-time investigation of order execution venues and the available 
executable order limits and quotes can improve execution results in agent and proprietary 
trading and finally portfolio performance.  
In the US, market fragmentation between equity markets and the Electronic Communication 
Networks introduced in the late „90s triggered specific order routing concepts to assure best 
execution. The US Order Protection Rule does not allow a trading centre to execute an order 
at a price that is inferior to the price of a protected quotation, often representing an investor‟s 
limit order displayed by another trading centre, and thereby avoids trade-throughs. RegNMS 
modified the Order Protection Rule and introduced the concept of automated and manual 
markets whereby manual quotations are excluded from the set of quotations that are protected 
against trade-throughs (Securities and Exchange Commission 2005).  
In  Europe,  equity  trading  was  concentrated  on  the  respective  national  stock  exchange  in 
various member states of the European Union (EU) until November 2007. As the successor 
of  the  1993  Investment  Services  Directive  (ISD),  the  Markets  in  Financial  Instruments 
Directive  (MiFID)  has  to  be  applied  by  regulated  markets  and  investment  firms  from 
November  1
st,  2007  (European  Commission  2004).  MiFID  aims  at  establishing  a  single 
market and a homogenous regulatory regime for investment services across the European 
Economic Area and triggered important changes for European securities markets. Within the 
directive,  best  execution of investors‟ orders is  a core component
3. However,  what  „best 
execution‟ means in MiFID practice, is largely determined by the relatively broad policy 
approach  that  MiFID  calls  for  and  the  individual  implementation  of  the  best  execution 
requirements  by  investment  firms:  The  rule  framework  can  be  implemented  as  a  static 
approach, i.e. based on historical data the investment firms‟ rule engine selects the execution 
venue  that  provides  the  best  result  on  a  consistent  basis  neglecting  the  current  market 
situation and data when executing individual orders. Most investment firms apply this static 
best execution approach, i.e. stick to the MiFID minimum requirements (Gomber, Pujol and 
Wranik  2008).  Technology  is  available,  specifically  Smart  Order  Routing  systems,  that 
enables to access multiple liquidity pools to identify the best destination by using proprietary 
                                                           
3 MiFID requires investment firms to execute customer orders on terms most favourable to the client. The best 
execution obligation is detailed in Article 21(1) MiFID that requires investment firms to “take all reasonable 
steps to obtain … the best possible result … taking into account price, costs, speed, likelihood of execution and 
settlement, size, nature or any other consideration relevant to the execution of the order.”   3 
algorithms that optimise order execution. They scan markets in real-time to determine the 
best bid and offer limits or quotes for a specific order, thereby achieving the best price. 
Figure 1 illustrates this process. 
 
Figure 1 – Operating principle of a Smart Order Router (SOR) 
The Smart Order Router – which is an implementation of best execution that exceeds the 
current  MiFID  minimum  requirements  –  selects  the  appropriate  execution  venue  on  a 
dynamic basis, i.e. current market data feeds of information vendors are used by the rule 
framework. Such provisions support a dynamic allocation of the order to the execution venue 
offering  the  best  conditions  at  the  time  of  order  entry  including  or  excluding  explicit 
transaction costs and/or other factors (e.g. the current technical latency of the venue). In order 
to  achieve  the  best  result  in  order  execution  on  a  real-time  basis,  i.e.  price  and  explicit 
execution costs (the total consideration in MiFID terminology), two steps are required: First, 
at order arrival a routing system of an investment firm has to screen the respective execution 
venues for their order book situations, i.e. the execution price dimension. Second, the system 
has to incorporate a model that enables to calculate the total execution price of trades in 
different markets including applicable trading, clearing and settlement fees or even taxes, i.e. 
the explicit costs dimension (Domowitz 2002).  
With an increasing focus on efficient order execution and technological sophistication of  
order routing concepts, one would expect suboptimal order executions, i.e. executions at a 
price that is worse than an executable price in a different market not to exist in Europe to a 
significant extent, at least on a net basis, i.e. after the inclusion of transaction costs. 
To evaluate this hypothesis in this paper  
SOR
Buy Order:
1000 shares
Bid Ask
50 @ 96€ 100 @100€
… …
Bid Ask
90 @ 95€ 600 @  98€
… 20 @ 100€
Bid Ask
80 @ 97€ 400 @  99€
… 50 @ 101€
real-time data
600 shares  4 
  first,  we  analyse  the  existence  of  suboptimal  order  executions  in  ten  European 
securities markets from a gross perspective, i.e. for every trade which occurs in a 
sample of EURO STOXX 50 equities in two weeks in late 2007 and early 2008, we 
seek better execution conditions (lower best asks for buy and higher best bids for sell 
orders) in a set of markets where a respective stock is traded simultaneously.  
  Second,  we  include  the  explicit  transaction  costs  component  by  assuming  two 
different scenarios of cost structures in European cross-system trading and apply these 
cost structures to the gross results derived in the first step. 
The applied methodology enables to assess and to track the efficiency of order execution in 
European equity markets. Furthermore, the results allow investors as well as investment firms 
assessing the value generation potential of Smart Order Routing systems on a net basis. As 
we analyse executions dated after November 1
st, 2007, the results will enable regulators to 
assess  the  effectiveness  of  European  best  execution  provisions  after  the  applicability  of 
MiFID and to evaluate the broad and flexible policy approach of MiFID relative to a strict 
trade through regime as applied by RegNMS. The comparison of the gross results and the net 
results furthermore provide insights on the impact of transaction costs, specifically costs in 
clearing and settlement, on order routing decisions. Also this comparison is an indication for 
the value generation potential of an integrated European market where the concept of cross-
system settlement is redundant.   
An  important  limitation  concerning  the  transaction  costs  arise  from  the  fact  that  the 
individual investment firms that are executing the respective trades are not included in public 
data sets and therefore beyond the authors‟ knowledge. Thus, based on publicly available 
information on trading and post trading costs from institutions along the securities trading 
value chain (exchanges, clearing houses and Central Securities Depositories), assumptions on 
costs  structures  for  the  order  executing  firms  are  derived  and  applied  identically  for  all 
executed  orders  in  two  scenarios  (one  scenario  with  direct  access  to  the  respective 
infrastructures and therefore low costs and one high-cost scenario where intermediaries are 
assumed to provide the access to the market infrastructures).  
The remainder of the paper is organised as follows: Section 2 reviews previous literature on 
cross  market  trading  and  execution  quality.  Section  3  elaborates  on  our  instrument  and 
marketplace  choice,  describes  the  dataset  and  explains  the  assumptions  and  adaptations 
necessary  for  the  analysis  of  trade-throughs.  Section  4  presents  the  assumptions  for  the   5 
applied  transaction  cost  scenarios.  Section  5  discusses  our  results.  A  conclusion  and  an 
outlook are provided in section 6. 
 
2 Related literature 
As  our  work  tries  to  empirically  assess  the  extent  of  suboptimal  order  executions  in 
fragmented markets, our research is related to three specific streams in market microstructure,  
literature  on  (i)  cross  market  trading,  (ii)  international  cross  listings  and  (iii)  execution 
quality: 
While  most  classic  paradigms  in  theoretical  market  microstructure  focus  on  centralised 
(securities)  markets,  modern  equilibrium  theory  also  addresses  fragmented  markets  (e.g. 
Biais 1993). As market fragmentation is mainly a US phenomenon (O‟Harra 2004) most 
literature  on  cross  market  trading  deals  with  the  American  trading  landscape.  Although 
theory on cross market trading implies the emergence of one dominant market (Chowdhry 
and  Nanda  1991),  in  the  US  and  recently  in  Europe
4  a trend towards fragmentation has 
commenced. This raises the question on the impact of fragmentation on market quality. 
Theory implies that market fragmentation negatively affects liquidity provision, increases 
price volatility and leads to violations of price efficiency (Mendelson 1987, Madhavan 1995). 
The implications from empirical work are less clear: concerning Dow stocks that are traded 
on multiple US markets the results of the econometrical model by (Hasbrouck 1995) imply 
that the NYSE remains the predominant contributor to price discovery. Studies like (Cohen et 
al. 1985, Porter and Thatcher 1998) observe negative effects of fragmentation on market 
quality  and  (Amihud et al. 2003, Barclay and Hendershott 2004, Benett and Wei 2006) 
provide evidence that order consolidation improves liquidity provision and pricing efficiency. 
On the contrary, other studies like (Battalio 1997, Fong et al. 2001, Conrad et al. 2005) report 
no negative impact from fragmentation for the case of competing markets. (Foerster  and 
Karolyi 1998) who analyse the effect of cross -listings of stocks from the Toronto Stock 
Exchange on US exchanges even report that trading cost in means of overall posted and 
effective spreads in the domestic market decrease. However, they observe the  effect to be 
stronger for stocks that experience a significant shift of trading volume to the US exchange. 
                                                           
4 For data on the current status of European equity market fragmentation (in terms of market share), 
refer e.g. to http://fragmentation.fidessa.com.   6 
(Madhavan 1995) observes that some market participants – in particular large ones whose 
orders require multiple trades to be filled  – prefer to trade in fragmented markets where 
trades are not disclosed. Other reasons for this phenomenon are stated by (Bessembinder and 
Kaufmann 1997). They conclude for the observations of (Blume and Goldstein 1997) that for 
most executions of NYSE listed stocks that take place off the NYSE the selected exchange 
posts worse quotes that this might be due practices like order preferencing and payments for 
order flow. 
Concerning international cross listings academic literature is mostly centred on American 
Depository Receipts (ADRs). (Miller and Morey 1996) study intraday prices for ADRs at the 
NYSE and UK shares of Glaxo-Wellcome. As they find the price differences between those 
markets small during simultaneous trading they consider efficiency. Large fluctuations in 
deviations from theoretical parity over time are presented by (Froot and Dabora 1999), who 
examined the Anglo-American dual-listed company (DLC) Smithkline Beecham. They deny 
fundamental factors to be a reasonable explanation for their findings and rather cite issues 
related to currency risk, governance structures, legal contracts, liquidity, and taxation to be 
explanatory  factors.  Based  on  stocks  listed  at  the  Mexican  Stock  Exchange  and  their 
respective ADRs (Domowitz et al. 1998) highlight the importance of informational linkages. 
Their results show that in the case of freely available intermarket price information cross-
listings positively affect market quality in terms of reduced spreads, more precise public 
information  and  increased  liquidity  in  both  markets.  In  contrary  when  intermarket  price 
information is poor cross-listings weaken market quality as they reduce liquidity and increase 
volatility in the domestic market by a dispersion of informative order flow. (Bedi et al. 2003) 
and  (de  Jong  et  al.  2003)  study  the  case  of  DLCs,  which  effectively  represent  mergers 
between companies that agree to combine their operations and cash flows and have common 
dividend structures while retaining separate shareholder registries and identities, e.g. Unilever 
N.V.  and  Unilever  PLC.  Each  of  these  studies  find  large  and  systematic  price  parity 
deviations from their home market shares which they try to explain with tax, accounting, 
regulatory, governance and trading attributes. A few papers employ special intraday data for 
country-specific studies of relative price discovery in cross-listed and home-market shares. 
(Grammig et al. 2004) analyse this for DaimlerChrysler as a Global Registered Share (GRS), 
Deutsche Telekom and SAP (as ADRs) traded on Xetra in Germany and on the NYSE. They 
find that prices are largely determined in the home market rather than the foreign market. 
(Eun and Sabberwal 2003) support those findings for a sample of Canadian stocks. (Gagnon   7 
and Karolyi 2004) studied price deviations for nearly 600 pairs of cross-listed stocks from 39 
countries and find deviations from the home market of 20 to 85 basis points. 
With  competing  markets  statistics  on  their  execution  quality  become  more  and  more 
important: First, they can highlight the attractiveness of those markets and help them gaining 
new order flow. Second they are required for the evaluation of regulatory environments, such 
as  MiFID  or  Reg  NMS.  Accordingly,  again  a  rich  pool  of  literature  for  the  US  trading 
landscape exists. Typically execution quality is measured across trading venues by comparing 
trade prices with quotes from competing markets (e.g. Bessembinder and Kaufmann 1997 
and 1997a, Battalio et al. 1998, Bessembinder 1999, Bacidore et al. 1999). Their common 
consent for retail sized orders is that the NYSE offers investors the most favourable prices. 
On the other hand a comparison of institutional investors‟ trading costs at the NYSE and the 
Nasdaq by (Chan and Lakonishok 1997) indicates that there are cost advantages for trades at 
the NYSE in large firms while Nasdaq provides better prices for smaller ones. Based on 
concerns by (Macey and O‟Hara 1997) more recent literature argues that execution quality 
cannot be captured by the price dimension on its own. For instance (Battalio et al. 2003) 
compare  the  NYSE  with  Trimark  Securities,  a  Nasdaq  dealer.  Their  results  outline  that 
although the NYSE offers investors better prices, dimensions beyond the trade price like 
execution  speed,  depth  improvement  or  order-flow  payment  look  more  favourable  for 
Trimark. They conclude that if brokers pass parts of these payments to their investors, this 
would even lead to better net prices at Trimark. Aditionally, (Bacidore et al. 2003) highlight 
the importance of standardised methodologies to quantify execution quality as their results 
are sensitive to the employed calculation methodology. Finally, (Bakos et al. 1999) analysed 
the  law  of  one  price  against  the  background  of  brokers‟  execution  performance  and 
commissions.  They  found  relatively  few  price  improvements,  which  are  a  measure  of 
execution quality as they are sign for competitive pricing. The difference among brokers in 
obtaining price improvements  was  not  statistically significant,  but  the  brokers do  exhibit 
statistically significant differences in total trading costs. 
As the quality of order executions can vary heavily for different trading venues (Macey and 
O‟Hara 1997), a reasonable selection of a venue for a particular order appears to be more 
important than ever for the US and findings from (Battalio et al. 2002) indicate that strategic 
routing of decisions for orders, e.g. via Smart Order Routing, could help to improve overall 
order execution quality.   8 
Against the background of new technology driven opportunities in order handling (Ramistella 
2006) observed that the demand for reasonable order routing solutions has intensified for 
investment  firms.  (Foucault  and  Menkveld  2008)  analyse  the  implications  of  market 
fragmentation and the rate of price priority violations (i.e. an order was executed in a market 
providing an inferior price compared to a price available in a different market) of two trading 
venues for Dutch equities. From their findings they interpret trade-throughs as being due to a 
lack of automation of routing decisions. 
The  contribution  of  this  paper  to  the  existent  literature  is  threefold:  First,  it  examines 
suboptimal order executions in Europe rather than the US based on order book data rather 
than price data. Second, to the knowledge of the authors it is the first paper that empirically 
analyses execution performance including transactions costs after the MiFID introduction in 
Europe.  Third,  the  presented  results  highlight  the  relevance  of  Smart  Order  Routing 
technology in the new European landscape. 
3 Data, assumptions and methodology 
To enable for an empirical analysis of suboptimal order executions, in the following we will 
first define the key term “trade-through”, then describe the dataset, the data handling/cleaning 
operations  as  well  as  our  hypotheses.  Afterwards  chapter  4  will  elaborate  on  transaction  
costs in trading and post-trading and describe our different cost scenarios. 
3.1 Identifying suboptimal order executions as trade-throughs  
To identify suboptimal order executions, in the following we use the definition of trade-
throughs according to (Schwartz and Francioni 2004) stated below.  
Definition: Trade-Through 
A trade-through in a particular stock is said to take place “…when a transaction occurs at a 
price that is higher than the best posted offer or lower than the best posted bid and orders at 
these better prices are not included in the transaction”. 
Figure 2 shows an example of a trade-through between two markets on a gross basis where – 
although market A shows a best offer of 86.44 € – the buy order is executed on market B at 
86.50 € per share.   9 
   
Figure 2 – Example of a trade-through situation 
Moreover, we label a situation where an order could be executed in a different market with its 
full order size at a better price (better bid or better offer limit) to be a full trade-through, 
whereas a situation in which only a part of an order could be executed in a different market at 
a better price (better bid or better offer limit) is classified as a partial trade-through
5.  
To  identify  full  and  partial  trade-throughs,  for  each  order  execution  in  our  data  set,  we 
compare trade data (trade price and volume, trade direction and time stamp) of the market 
where the execution  actually  took  place (e.g. market  B in  figure  2) with  the order book 
situations in all other markets simultaneously at the time of this execution. A trade-through 
(full or partial) is found if at least one marketplace exists (e.g. market A in figure 2) where a 
strictly positive amount of savings could be realised. We pick the market with the highest 
potential overall savings for the trade.  
3.2 Hypothesis and statistical testing 
Assuming  traders‟  rational  behaviour  in  executing  their  orders  and  based  on  their 
responsibility  to  identify  the  best  result  for  clients‟  orders,  one  should  expect  that  the 
proportion  of  sub-optimally  executed  orders  will  not  reach  a  significant  level  after 
considering  explicit  transaction  costs,  i.e.  that  the  savings  which  could  be  realized  by 
switching  to  a  different  market  are  smaller  than  the  associated  costs.  For  testing  this 
hypothesis two variables are computed for each trade where a different market offers a price 
improvement (before costs): 
                                                           
5 A partial trade-through might turn into a full trade-through when the complete order book data is available 
(also orders beyond the top of the book) to be included in the analysis. As our dataset includes merely the best 
bid and offer limits (top of the order book) we apply the partial trade-through concept. 
… … …
11:35 100 86.50 … … …
11:35 500 86.44 86.42 343 11:35
Time Quantity Limit Limit Quantity Time
Offer     Bid 
Market A:
Market B:
11:36: Buy initiated execution 400 @ 86.50€
Trade-through of the better offer limit at market A.
This incurs the chance for a price improvement of 24€ (before costs).  10 
1.  Absolute amount of savings (Savings), defined as the maximum savings per trade if 
executed in a different market. 
2.  Relative price improvements (PI), defined as 
 
 
 
 
where Nbetter equals the quoted number of shares in the market offering a better price 
and Ntrade is the actual trade‟s number of shares. Pbetter is the potential price in the 
market offering better conditions and Ptrade the actual trade price. Nadjust = 1 reflects 
full trade-throughs, whereas Nadjust<1 reflects partial trade-throughs. 
Assuming that both test statistics have a Student’s t distribution under the null hypothesis 
both variables‟ means will be tested for 
H0: mean  ≤ switching costs    against     Ha: mean > switching costs. 
Results will be checked against those from a Wilcoxon signed-rank test as the number of 
observations strongly varies among combinations of stock and marketplace. 
3.3 Instrument and marketplace choice 
The instrument choice is based on the constituents of the Dow Jones EURO STOXX 50 
Index (as of October 2007) since those stocks represent the actively traded shares on multiple 
markets in Euro currency. The index covers 50 blue-chip stocks
6 from 12 Eurozone countries: 
Austria,  Belgium,  Finland,  France,  Germany,  Greece,  Ireland,  Italy,  Luxembourg,  the 
Netherlands, Portugal and Spain.
7 Table 1 provides the considered instruments. 
INSERT TABLE 1 ABOUT HERE 
                                                           
6 One EURO STOXX 50 instrument (ARCELORMITTAL) was not available in the data set, therefore the 
sample finally consists of 49 instruments of the index. 
7 For further information please refer to http://www.stoxx.com/indices/components.html?symbol=SX5E. 
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Concerning the execution venues in our sample, we included the European markets trading in 
Euro currency that feature a fully-electronic open central limit order book (CLOB) in the 
period under investigation.
8 Therefore, ten markets have been identified for this study: Bolsa 
de Madrid, Borsa Italiana Milan, Chi-X, four Euronext markets (Amsterdam, Brussels, Paris, 
and Lisbon), Helsinki Stock Exchange (NASDAQ OMX Helsinki), SWX Europe (formerly 
Virt-x) and Xetra (Deutsche Börse). 
The trading mechanisms of these execution venues for liquid stocks apply continuous trading. 
Opening and closing prices are set via  scheduled (time-triggered) call auction mechanisms
9. 
To assure price continuity, additional volatility interruptions  stop continuous trading in case 
of potential extreme price movements and trigger an unscheduled (event-triggered) auction.  
Except for Chi-X, all execution venues in our sample shift from continuous trading to a non-
scheduled auction for a minimum of two minutes following a  potential violation of price 
continuity.
10  
3.4 Description of the data set 
Intraday trade and order book data for each stock and for each market are sourced from the 
archives  of  Reuters.
11  For the markets in our sample, this database contains  each best 
bid/offer limit and trade price  with respective volume and a date and  time stamp with a 
granularity of one second assigned to it. The data set under investigation represents level 1 
data, i.e. it does not include depth of order book information, consisting of orders positioned 
beyond the top of the book (level 2 data). Reuters trade and order book data do not contain an 
indication of trade direction, which must therefore b e inferred. In the  ten fully electronic 
markets  these  inferences  are  straightforward.  All  trades  executed  at  the  best  offer  are 
categorised as buy-initiated; all trades executed at the best bid quote are categorised as sell-
initiated.
12  Total traded value a nd other aggregated  activity  figures for each stock were 
calculated from the Reuters trade and order book data.  
                                                           
8  E.g.  German  exchanges  like  Stuttgart,  Munich,  Hannover  and  Hamburg  or  PLUS  markets 
(http://www.plusmarketsgroup.com) in the UK have not been considered as their market models do not fully 
comply with these restrictions. 
9 While all other markets compute the opening price depending on their or der book data in the opening and 
closing auctions, Chi-X opening and prices are established using the opening price of a stock‟s primary market. 
10  The Chi-X trading system does not accept orders leading to a violation of price continuity. For further 
information, please refer to the Chi-X website (www.chi-x.com). 
11  Reuters archives were made available by the Australian Capital Markets Cooperative Research Centre 
Limited (CMCRC). 
12 For further information on tick rules, please refer to (Ellis, Michaely and O‟Hara, 2000).   12 
Our sample consists of 20 trading days divided into two distinct sample periods with the first 
from  December  10–21,  2007  and  the  second  from  January  7–18,  2008
13, i.e. after the 
applicability of MiFID. Altogether 8,010,905 executed trades representing an overall trading 
volume of € 262,314 million are included in the dataset.  
3.5 Data handling and data cleaning  
For the investigation, our dataset had to be cleaned and prepared in several dimensions. Trade 
and order book data lacking essential information (e.g. associated volume) were eliminated. 
In the case of order book data, the most recent valid limit orders featuring all information 
necessary for our analysis were considered for comparison of execution quality. Moreover, 
trades for which a trade direction could not unambiguously be determined were eliminated 
from the dataset. Regarding trade sizes no data cleaning measure were required.
14 
As trading hours among the ten electronic markets included in this study vary slightly, for a 
comparison of markets only the periods of simultaneous trading were taken as a basis. As we 
focus on continuous trading, auctions times were neglected and additionally, any order book 
or trading activity within two minutes around scheduled as well as non-scheduled auctions
15 
were eliminated from our dataset. Table 2 presents the trading hours for continuous trading 
for each market. Table 3 presents the minimum duration of a non-scheduled auction for each 
execution venue in our sample. Altogether from a total of 9.163.780 trades, 12.58 percent of 
trades were eliminated. 
INSERT TABLE 2 ABOUT HERE 
INSERT TABLE 3 ABOUT HERE 
As stated in section 3. 4,  our dataset contains time stamps for trades and quotes with a 
granularity of one second. With a quote change  in a comparison market arriving within the 
second of a trade in  the original market this new quote is considered available and thus 
                                                           
13 Note that the Société Générale trading loss incident was publicly announced after the end of the second 
sample period and therefore no bias is to be expected from it. 
14 We checked our dataset for trades qualifying as large in scale compared with Normal Market Size (NMS), i.e. 
500.000 Euro, as we would expect those trades to result from off -market transactions (CESR 2008). As the 
removal of these trades does not change our results we omitted this removal step within the reported ones. 
15 A non-scheduled auction (volatility interruption) for a stock was assumed whenever its best bid‟s and offer‟s 
limit price and volume were simultaneously set to zero followed by a period of at least two minutes with neither 
order book nor trading activity. For our investigations we filtered out all non-scheduled auctions that took place 
at the home market as it is the market where price discovery is expected to take place.   13 
presents the most recent order book situation to this trade. With more than one quote change 
within the second of a trade occurrence at one market, the quote resulting in the least savings 
is taken as a basis for an execution performance comparison in order to retrieve a lower 
boundary for the possible price improvements. 
4 Explicit transaction costs in order execution 
Trading refers to the actual order submission/execution process and clearing ensures that all 
the prerequisites for the later settlement are in place so that at the conclusion of that process 
each  market  participant  is  aware  of  what  its  settlement  obligations  are  vis-à-vis  all  its 
counterparties  for  the  deals  executed  on  a  certain  trade  date  (Stehm  1996).  A  Central 
Counterparty (CCP) adopts functions that enable a market to provide post trade anonymity,  
netting  efficiency
16  and facilitation of risk managemen t  (Schwartz  and  Francioni 2004). 
Settlement is “…the act of crediting and debiting the transferee’s and transferor’s accounts 
respectively, with the aim of completing a transaction in securities” (CESAME Sub-Group 
on definitions 2005, p.12). Settlement represents the last act of the transfer process and takes 
place at Central Securities Depositories (CSDs). Once that transfer is legally binding, the 
securities transfer is considered as being final (Bank for International Settlements 1992). 
Due to a relevant fragmentation in European post-trading infrastructures, it is expected that 
trading and  clearing  and  specifically  (cross-system) settlement  costs are a key  driver for 
suboptimal order executions in European equity markets. While the execution venues and 
respective  clearing  and  settlement  providers  differ  in  their  cost  structures  for  domestic 
trading, the main driver of explicit costs when trading internationally are the cross-system 
settlement  costs  (in  the  following  referred  to  as  transfer  costs)
17. To exactly determine 
whether an individual execution is a trade-through on a net basis, one would need to identify 
the individual investment firm executing the trade and its individual (trade and post -trade) 
intermediaries‟/service  providers‟  fee  levels.  As  the  analysis  is  based  on  public  data, 
information  on the investment  firm  that executed a  trade is not  available. Therefore,  we 
assume different scenarios of cost structures where in each scenario one specific level of 
                                                           
16 Netting is the process of off-setting positions in cash and securities of opposite directions per security and 
market user. The netting efficiency is the ratio between the number of transactions falling off from settlement 
because of this netting procedure and the total number of transactions. 
17 Brokerage costs are not included in the analysis as it is assumed that the broker/investment firm is the decision 
point for order routing and consequently their cost structures are taken as the basis of the analysis.   14 
costs is assumed consistently for all investment firms (in the following referred to as model 
user) in that scenario. 
We  consider  explicit  costs  for  trading,  counterparty  risk  clearing  and  settlement  services 
(Oxera  2007)  by  modeling  the  variable  costs  directly  related  to  the  execution  of  trades. 
Therefore, fix costs like all annual fees, one-off access fees, etc. are considered as being paid 
anyway and are not added as a cost component to an individual order.  
The fees charged in the different trading platforms depend on various factors that drive the 
final total charge, e.g. because the fee schedules often are based on how much business a 
participant brought to the systems. Therefore, assumptions about the size of the model user 
are necessary in order to apply the fee schedules of the trading platforms and of providers of 
CCP clearing and settlement. Moreover, assumptions about how many partial fills apply to 
an order on average are required to allow a price comparison. Some service providers charge 
fees based on partial fills, others only on the orders sent to the respective service provider. 
For consistency reasons, the model user is assumed to reach an annual number of orders that 
enables to reach the highest discount levels in all of the markets which are analysed.  In 
particular the markets of Italy and France require considerably high numbers of transactions 
in order to achieve the highest discount levels. The assumptions concerning partial fills and 
price level hits per order in connection with a certain average €-value per order, are based on 
numbers provided by Deutsche Börse in an exemplary cost calculation for Xetra (Deutsche 
Börse AG 2007, p.1). In that document, Deutsche Börse sets the number of partial fills and 
the number of price levels hit in a relation to the value of an order posted to its trading 
platform. This relation has been taken as being linear between the data points provided and 
used in order to derive the corresponding values for the assumed order size. Although there is 
no exact data about the netting efficiency achieved by the single European CCPs, Deutsche 
Börse in a quarterly balance statement published to achieve 90% (Deutsche Börse AG 2003, 
p.5).  Therefore,  a  netting  efficiency  of  90%  has  been  applied  for  all  markets.  Our 
assumptions can be found in Table 4. 
INSERT TABLE 4 ABOUT HERE 
As the number of partial executions and the average number of price level hits depends on the 
order size of individual orders, for our cost analysis orders with characteristics as given in 
Table 5 are applied.   15 
INSERT TABLE 5 ABOUT HERE 
Applying the above assumptions, the domestic costs per market are based on the respective 
institutions‟ publicly available fee schedules and presented in the following table. As the fees 
(non-linear) depend on the executed order sizes we derived typical and relevant
18 order sizes 
for the fee computation. In order to determine the costs for a particular trade-through of given 
order size, we interpolate these costs. 
INSERT TABLE 6 ABOUT HERE 
In cross-system trading, clearing and settlement, t ransaction costs depend on the channels 
used for access to the national CSDs. (Giovanni ni Group 2001) lists five different access 
routes for an international investment firm to a foreign CSD.  Based on (Giovannini Group 
2001), figure 3 shows these five different possibilities to access a foreign settlement system 
in Europe. 
 
Figure 3 – Access alternatives to foreign settlement systems 
                                                           
18 The figures concerning the sizes of the orders and related characteristics are derived from different sources. 
First the order sizes of 25,000, 45,000 and 100,000 Euros are the same as used in a study by the European 
Commission  on  the  competition  of  securities  trading  and  post-trading  in  Europe  (European  Commission, 
Competition DG 2006, p. 28). The order size of 7,500 Euros per order has been published as average retail order 
size by an association of German retail banks in the course of its MiFID best execution policy  (Deutscher 
Sparkassen- und Giroverband e.V. 2007). The size of 200,000 Euros is considered an approximation  for a 
wholesale order size as published by Clearstream Banking Luxembourg (Deutsche Börse Group 2002, p.19). 
Finally,  the  order  sizes  of  one  Euro  and  one  million  Euros  are  supposed  to  provide  the  lower  and  upper 
boundary for the costs.   16 
In order to settle a transaction in a particular security, both counterparties must have access to 
systems  where  it  is  possible  to  deliver  and  receive  the  security  in  question.  Thus,  the 
distinctive feature of cross-system  settlement  is gaining access to  a settlement system in 
another country and/or the interaction of different settlement systems.  
The  first  option  for  a  foreign  investment  firm  to  access  the  CSD  in which  a  security  is 
primarily  listed,  is  direct  (non-intermediated)  access  to  that  CSD.  That  means  that  the 
investment firm involves directly in domestic clearing and settlement, has own arrangements 
required in place and is holding a securities and cash account directly to the respective CSD 
and payment system. 
The options two to five are options where the investment firm (or any international investor) 
uses the services of intermediaries to access the foreign settlement systems. Settlement via 
intermediaries includes settlement via International Central Security Depositories (ICSDs) 
(option two), via local agents (option three) or through a global custodian (option four). The 
fifth option makes use of CSD to CSD links. For our analysis, we apply option two as (i) for 
the services by local agents or a global custodian (options three and four) prices are mostly 
negotiated and not publicly available (Bank for International Settlements 1995) and (ii) with 
regard to option five, multiple initiatives in Europe try to enforce the use of CSD links as a 
less expensive alternative, but (as of end 2007/early 2008) they are only available between a 
limited number of CSDs and in this case mostly for a limited number of securities and so far 
seldom used (Kauko 2007). Furthermore, within our investigation we observed the costs of 
settlement via CSD links to lie in between the costs of scenario 1 and the costs of scenario 2. 
Thus, the CSD link approach would provide no additional information concerning the lower 
or higher boundaries of the cost ranges. 
For  the  analysis,  we  compute  the  transaction  costs  for  a  model  user  both  in  one  non-
intermediated and one intermediated scenario. Thereby we aim to assure that we provide a 
lower and an upper boundary for the relevant transaction costs:  
  Scenario 1 represents the first option of (Giovanni Group 2001), i.e. the model user 
has direct access to all facilities necessary along the transaction chain, i.e. trading, 
clearing and settlement facilities, in all European markets of our sample. It is assumed 
that the model user is a direct member of the trading platforms and clearing houses 
and that it holds securities accounts for settlement at the CSDs given in Table 7 and 
possesses  cash  accounts  with  the  relevant  central  banks.  Scenario  1  therefore   17 
represents  the lower boundary  regarding  the variable  explicit transaction costs for 
individual orders. 
INSERT TABLE 7 ABOUT HERE 
  In scenario 2, which will represent the upper cost boundary, cross-system settlements 
are conducted via ICSDs which charge an investment firm transfer fees (option two of 
Giovanni Group 2001). The respective transfer costs applied for our analysis have 
been  derived  from  the  publicly  available  fee  schedules  of  Clearstream  Banking 
Luxembourg and Euroclear Bank
19 (as of late 2007/early 2008) and are presented in 
table 8
20.  
INSERT TABLE 8 ABOUT HERE 
For the case of an investor involved in trading in two  different countries our stylised model 
user set-up can be illustrated as in Figure 4 for the two scenarios. 
 
Figure 4 – Model user set-up for the case of the two scenarios 
To  evaluate  whether  a  trade-through  still  holds  after  the  inclusion  of  explicit  costs, 
information about three cost variables is required: 
  Total costs for trading, clearing and settlement in market A (from Table 6) 
                                                           
19 As both Clearstream Banking Luxembourg and Euroclear Bank provide cross-system settlement services and 
their charges slightly differ, we consider the least expensive one for each trade in our sample. 
20 Since Chi-X trades are throughout settled in a security‟s domestic home CSD, transfer costs do not apply here.   18 
  Total costs for trading, clearing and settlement in market B (from Table 6) 
  Costs for the securities‟ transfer in scenario 2 (from Table 8) 
In scenario 1 for a trade-through we consider a situation where it is possible to buy (sell) in 
market B at a more favourable price than buying on market A. However, with the costs for 
trading, clearing and settlement in both markets being different, these differences in costs 
need to be considered when executing a trade in one market instead of the other. 
In scenario 2, the additional costs for the transfer of the equities bought or sold need to be 
included. It is assumed that the respective securities are kept in the CSD of the market where 
the securities could be bought (sold) causing costs for a delivery or receive instruction at the 
CSD where the security could be bought (sold) and a delivery or receive instruction at the 
ICSD, i.e. one external instruction to the respective market. 
In section 5 we will first present the results for the gross perspective, i.e. without including 
explicit  transaction  costs,  and  afterwards  for  the  non-intermediated  scenario  1  and  the 
intermediated scenario 2. 
5. Results  
Results for trade-throughs in the different scenarios will be presented as follows: First this 
section  will  deal  with  the  findings  on  trade-throughs  addressing  summarising  descriptive 
statistics.  This  will  be  followed  by  an  illustrative  in-depth  analysis  for  an  exemplary 
instrument with our results broken down into the gross perspective and the individual cost 
scenarios described in the previous section. Consequently, our test statistics for the relative 
and absolute savings will be presented.  
Table 9 summarises the overall results from the gross perspective as well as the different cost 
scenarios.  Without  considering  explicit  costs  from  our  total  of  8,010,905  trades,  6.71% 
(absolute: 537,764) could have been executed at a better price with their full volumes (full 
trade-throughs), 6.45% (absolute: 516,797) at least with a part of their volumes (partial trade-
throughs) with potential total savings of  € 9.50 million, average savings per trade-through of 
9.01 € and savings of 7.54 bps (0.36 bps) relative to total trade-through value (relative to total 
traded  value).  For  the  cost  scenario  1,  total  savings  increase  compared  to  the  no  costs 
perspective as potential savings in explicit costs might add up on top of price improvements. 
This is the case whenever a market does not only offer a better execution price but is also less   19 
expensive in terms of transaction costs. With the explicit cost scenario 2 incurring explicit 
transaction  costs  (and  particularly  the  costs  for  the  securities  transfer)  those  proportions 
obviously shrink, but still result to 1.41 % (absolute: 112,770) of full and 1.34 % (absolute: 
107,483)  of  partial  trade-throughs  with  potential  total  savings  of  €  5.9  million,  average 
savings per trade-through of 26.83 € and savings of 10.17 bps (0.23 bps) relative to total 
trade-through value (relative to total traded value). 
INSERT TABLE 9 ABOUT HERE 
In the following tables these figures will be detailed for the individual EURO STOXX 50 
securities. Table 10 provides the (gross) perspective without the inclusion of explicit trading 
costs.  Generally,  our  findings  exhibit  a  high  level  of  heterogeneity  among  instruments 
regarding the trade-through characteristics with the minimum of full trade-through percentage 
at 0.16 and the maximum at 16.70 percent.  
INSERT TABLE 10 ABOUT HERE 
Table 11 describes the non-intermediated cost scenario 1, while table 12 presents the results 
for the intermediated ICSD cost scenario 2. For the later scenario absolute savings obviously 
decrease relative to those from the gross perspective, as potential savings are reduced and 
partly even absorbed by the accruing transfer costs. Not so for scenario 1, as transfer costs do 
not accrue and the difference in explicit trading costs between two markets potentially adds to 
savings if the market providing a price improvement also features lower domestic trading 
costs. 
INSERT TABLES 11 & 12 HERE 
TOTAL led the EURO STOXX 50 index in terms of market capitalisation as of December 
31
st, 2007  (STOXX  Ltd. 2008). Therefore,  in  the following  TOTAL  will  be taken as  an 
example to explain our key figures for the gross perspective in table 13 and for the non-
intermediated cost scenario 1 in table 14 as well as for the intermediated ICSD cost scenario 
2 in table 15 respectively. 
INSERT TABLES 13, 14 & 15 ABOUT HERE   20 
Tables 13 to 15 feature the analysis results in the different cost scenarios for the individual 
execution venues. The “Overall” column summarises over all markets.  The table‟s upper 
section gives an overview on the markets‟ activity for TOTAL applying characteristic figures 
which is obviously identical in the different scenarios. Trade activity varies heavily among 
market places with the second in number of trades (here: Chi-X) not even measuring up to 
one  tenth  of  that  of  the  primary  exchange  (here:  Euronext  Paris).  This  is  a  common 
observation  for  most  stocks  in  our  sample  highlighting  that  the  home  markets  principle 
(Schwartz and Francioni 2004) prevails up to the time of the analysis. The lower section 
introduces  our findings  on trade-throughs  for each market  with  percentages  and absolute 
figures on full and partial trade-throughs. For example in the gross perspective for TOTAL 
(table 13) 14.58 % or 42,815 out of the 293,729 trades which occurred in Euronext Paris 
could have been executed in its full size at a better price in (at least) one of the other markets. 
Potential accumulated savings over all trades are shown along with the absolute and relative 
average savings per trade-through [Avg. savings per trade-through and Savings/trade-through 
value respectively]. Finally, the savings are related to the total trade value for each market.  
Table 16 presents the mean observed switching costs and t-statistics of TOTAL respectively 
for each market for the cost scenario 2. As described in section 3.2 we tested the relative 
price improvements [PI] and absolute savings [Savings] against those switching costs. Our 
findings  are  heterogeneous  among  stocks:  Since  this  scenario  incurs  explicit  costs  for 
domestic transactions and securities transfer as described in section 4, the null hypotheses of 
no systematic relative price improvement and absolute savings cannot be statistically rejected 
for some stocks (e.g. TOTAL). On the other hand, for some stocks in our sample the null 
hypothesis of no systematic savings after transaction costs can be rejected, e.g. Table 17 
presents our findings for AXA, where the null hypothesis of no systematic absolute savings 
can  be  rejected,  as  the  potential  savings  from  switching  a  trade  to  a  different  market 
significantly exceed the associated transaction costs. 
INSERT TABLES 16 and 17 ABOUT HERE 
Results show that investors could have realised significant savings on their trades  across 
multiple  instruments  resulting  from  execution  conditions  superior  to  those  in  the  actual 
execution venue even when considering different levels of explicit transaction costs. 
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6. Conclusions 
After the introduction of MiFID, the European trading landscape moved from concentration 
rules to relevant market fragmentation and the best execution rules imposed by MiFID urge 
investment firms to achieve the best possible result for their customers. Nevertheless, MiFID 
applies a specific benchmark (price and explicit transaction) for order execution only for 
retail trades and does not enforce a strict trade-through regime like RegNMS. Against this 
background, the paper  –  based on a  four week data set  of EURO STOXX 50 securities 
consisting of 8 million executed trades with an overall value of € 262 billion – assesses the 
extent of suboptimal order executions after the introduction of MiFID both with and without 
considering explicit transaction costs by applying different cost scenarios. The analysis shows 
that there is a relevant and partly significant extent of suboptimal order executions where a 
different execution venue provides a better executable limit both in the gross and the net 
perspective: In the gross perspective, 6.71% of orders can be executed better in their full size 
(6.45% of orders partially) enabling for total savings of € 9.50 million within our sample 
period, i.e. 7.54 bps relative to total trade-through value and 0.36 bps relative to total traded 
value. Even in the cost scenario assuming explicit transaction costs which include the costs 
for the transfer of securities, 1.41 % of orders can be executed better in their full size (1.34 % 
of orders partially) enabling for total savings of  € 5.90 million, i.e. 10.17 bps relative to total 
trade-through value and 0.23 bps relative to total traded value.  
Given this evidence transaction costs alone as a form of market friction do not serve as an 
explanation for the existence of trade-throughs in Europe. Many investment firms seem to 
still apply established and pre-defined standard order routing mechanisms that are mostly 
targeting one market per security only (e.g. the national stock exchange or the “home market” 
of the respective security). (Gomber, Pujol and Wranik 2008) have revealed that for the case 
of German investment firms best execution implementation mostly relies on these standard 
routing mechanisms and only a very low rate of real time smart order routing solutions for 
could be found.  
The developed methodology and parameters enable for assessing and future tracking of the 
efficiency of order execution in European equity markets and the effectiveness of regulatory 
measures both on the trading level, e.g. MiFID, or on the post-trading level, e.g. the Code of 
Conduct for Clearing and Settlement. As a future extension of the analysis, the inclusion of   22 
the order book depth of the respective markets (level 2 data) will allow to apply the concept 
of full trade-through to all the trades and to eliminate the partial trade-through approach. 
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Appendix 
Table 1 – Euro Stoxx Instruments (Name, ISIN) analysed in this study 
AEGON, NL0000303709                   IBERDROLA, ES0144580Y14                
AIR LIQUIDE, FR0000120073               ING GROEP, NL0000303600                
ALCATEL LUCENT, FR0000130007           INTESA SANPAOLO, IT0000072618  
ALLIANZ, DE0008404005                  L'OREAL, FR0000120321                 
ASSICURAZIONI GENERALI, IT0000062072  LVMH MOET HENNESSY, FR0000121014      
AXA, FR0000120628                     MUENCHENER RUECK, DE0008430026     
BANCO SANTANDER, ES0113900J37        NOKIA, FI0009000681                    
BASF, DE0005151005                    PHILIPS ELECTRONICS, NL0000009538    
BAYER, DE0005752000                 RENAULT, FR0000131906           
BCO BILBAO VIZCAYA ARGENT, ES0113211835  REPSOL YPF, ES0173516115          
BNP PARIBAS, FR0000131104  RWE, DE0007037129               
CARREFOUR SUPERMARCHE, FR0000120172     SAINT GOBAIN, FR0000125007 
CREDIT AGRICOLE, FR0000045072   SANOFI-AVENTIS, FR0000120578         
DAIMLER AG, DE0007100000  SAP, DE0007164600                    
DEUTSCHE BANK, DE0005140008          SCHNEIDER ELECTRIC, FR0000121972     
DEUTSCHE BOERSE, DE0005810055           SIEMENS, DE0007236101                
DEUTSCHE TELEKOM, DE0005557508         SUEZ, FR0000120529           
E.ON, DE0007614406                   TELECOM ITALIA, IT0003497168         
ENEL, IT0003128367                    TELEFONICA, ES0178430E18            
ENI, IT0003132476                       TOTAL, FR0000120271              
FORTIS, BE0003801181                   UNICREDITO ITALIANO, IT0000064854      
FRANCE TELECOM, FR0000133308            UNILEVER NV, NL0000009355           
GROUPE DANONE, FR0000120644  VINCI, FR0000125486               
GROUPE SOCIETE GENERALE, FR0000130809   VIVENDI UNIVERSAL, FR0000127771       
  VOLKSWAGEN, DE0007664005            
 
Table 2 – Trading hours for continuous trading 
Stock Exchange  Trading hours for continuous 
trading (CET) 
Begin  End  Begin  End 
Xetra DAX  09:00  13:00  13:02  17:30 
Xetra Stoxx  09:04  13:10  13:12  17:30 
Euronext (all)  09:00  -  -  17:30 
Borsa Italiana Milan  09:05  -  -  17:25 
Bolsa de Madrid  09:00  -  -  17:30 
SWX Europe  09:00  -  -  17:20 
Chi-X  09:00  -  -  17:30 
Helsinki Stock 
Exchange 
09:00  -  -  17:20   27 
Table 3 – Minimum duration of non-scheduled auctions 
 
Stock Exchange  Minimum duration of non-
scheduled auctions (in minutes) 
Xetra   2 (plus random end) 
Euronext (all)  2 
Borsa Italiana Milan  12 
Bolsa de Madrid  5 (plus 30-second random end) 
SWX Europe  5 
Chi-X  n/a 
Helsinki Stock 
Exchange 
Determined individually 
 
Table 4 – Assumptions regarding the model user 
Annual number of orders  7,501,250 
Avg. €-value per order  45,000 
Partial fills per order  2.05 
Price level hits per order  2.01 
Netting efficiency  90.00% 
 
Table 5 – Model user order size assumptions 
Orders with €-value 
Avg. number of 
partial executions 
Avg. number of price level 
hits 
7,500  1.00  1.00 
25,000  1.50  1.50 
45,000  2.05  2.01 
100,000  2.50  2.13 
200,000  3.40  2.35 
 
Table 6 – Domestic transaction costs per market for respective order sizes 
 
   
Market / Order size 1 € 7,500 € 25,000 € 45,000 € 100,000 € 200,000 € 1,000,000 €
Xetra 1.15 € 1.15 € 2.01 € 3.27 € 6.74 € 13.04 € 24.16 €
EN Amsterdam 1.47 € 1.47 € 2.67 € 3.79 € 4.90 € 6.92 € 8.14 €
EN Paris 1.47 € 1.47 € 2.67 € 3.79 € 4.90 € 6.92 € 8.14 €
Bolsa de Madrid 1.14 € 5.78 € 8.40 € 10.90 € 15.20 € 16.90 € 16.90 €
Borsa Italiana 0.34 € 0.36 € 0.53 € 0.70 € 0.75 € 0.86 € 0.86 €
Helsinki Stock Exchange 1.05 € 1.35 € 2.04 € 2.83 € 5.01 € 8.97 € 11.05 €
Chi-X 0.47 € 0.73 € 1.35 € 2.05 € 3.88 € 7.20 € 30.81 €
SWX Europe 0.95 € 1.32 € 2.35 € 3.53 € 6.72 € 12.51 € 38.95 €
EN Brussels 1.47 € 1.47 € 2.67 € 3.79 € 4.90 € 6.92 € 8.14 €
EN Lisbon 1.47 € 1.47 € 2.67 € 3.79 € 4.90 € 6.92 € 8.14 €  28 
Table 7 – Trading, clearing and settlement facilities with direct access by the model user 
Trading platforms  Clearing houses  CSDs 
Bolsas y Mercados 
Españoles  CC&G 
Clearstream Banking 
Frankfurt 
Borsa Italiana  EMCF  Euroclear France 
Chi-X  Eurex Clearing  Iberclear 
Deutsche Börse Xetra  Iberclear  Monte Titoli 
Euronext Amsterdam  LCH. Clearnet Ltd.  NCSD 
Euronext Brussels  LCH. Clearnet S.A.  SegaInterSettle 
Euronext Lisbon  NCSD   
Euronext Paris  SIS x-clear   
OMX Helsinki     
SWX Europe       
 
Table 8 – ICSD transfer costs among the respective exchanges (€) 
 
Table 9 – Descriptive statistics of trade-throughs for all instruments 
 
Source (row) / 
Destination 
(column) Xetra EN Brussels EN Paris
Borsa 
Italiana SWX Europe
EN 
Amsterdam EN Lisbon
Helsinki 
Stock 
Exchange Chi-X
Bolsa de 
Madrid
Xetra n/a 7.36 7.36 25.00 21.95 7.36 31.40 27.35 n/a 29.63
EN Brussels 6.56 n/a 7.36 25.00 21.95 7.36 31.40 27.35 n/a 29.63
EN Paris 6.56 7.36 n/a 25.00 21.95 7.36 31.40 27.35 n/a 29.63
Borsa Italiana 6.56 7.36 7.36 n/a 21.95 7.36 31.40 27.35 n/a 29.63
SWX Europe 6.56 7.36 7.36 25.00 n/a 7.36 31.40 27.35 n/a 29.63
EN 
Amsterdam 6.56 7.36 7.36 25.00 21.95 n/a 31.40 27.35 n/a 29.63
EN Lisbon 6.56 7.36 7.36 25.00 21.95 7.36 n/a 27.35 n/a 29.63
Helsinki Stock 
Exchange 6.56 7.36 7.36 25.00 21.95 7.36 31.40 n/a n/a 29.63
Chi-X 6.56 7.36 7.36 25.00 21.95 7.36 31.40 27.35 n/a 29.63
Bolsa de 
Madrid 6.56 7.36 7.36 25.00 21.95 7.36 31.40 27.35 n/a n/a
All instruments No costs Scenario 1 Scenario 2
Number of trades
Value [€ mn]
Value per trade [€]
% full trade through 6.71 6.60 1.41
% partial trade 
through
6.45 5.30 1.34
Savings [€] 9,502,869 9,709,864 5,908,346
Avg. savings per trade 
through [€]
9.01 10.21 26.83
Savings / trade 
through value [bps]
7.54 7.80 10.17
Savings / trade value 
[bps]
0.36 0.37 0.23
8,010,905
262,313.9
32,745  29 
Table 10 – Summary statistics trade-throughs for all instruments (gross perspective) 
 
Instrument
Number of 
trades
Value [€ 
mn]
Value per 
trade [€]
% full 
trade 
through
% partial 
trade 
through
Savings [€]
Avg. 
savings per 
trade 
through [€]
Savings / 
trade 
through 
value [bps]
Savings / 
trade value 
[bps]
AEGON 125,881 2,397.4 19,045 14.30 6.24 287,978 11.14 9.72 1.20
AIR LIQUIDE     137,656 1,960.0 14,238 5.21 3.68 18,804 1.54 2.35 0.10
ALCATEL LUCENT 117,490 1,730.5 14,729 8.05 6.90 113,667 6.47 14.20 0.66
ALLIANZ 190,387 8,673.0 45,555 13.29 14.34 272,392 5.18 3.50 0.31
ASSICURAZIONI 
GENERALI 112,315 2,984.2 26,570 0.21 0.11 3,099 8.80 5.64 0.01
AXA 208,272 5,143.0 24,694 11.61 9.73 881,357 19.83 18.71 1.71
BASF 131,899 5,487.2 41,602 7.43 8.24 84,518 4.09 2.81 0.15
BAYER 135,287 5,912.6 43,704 6.19 8.47 112,074 5.65 4.16 0.19
BCO BILBAO VIZCAYA 
ARGENT 137,718 6,415.8 46,587 0.56 0.94 20,345 9.82 10.24 0.03
BCO SANTANDER 165,497 11,024.8 66,616 11.88 22.17 2,034,860 36.11 32.59 1.85
BNP PARIBAS 297,256 6,746.5 22,696 16.70 12.86 337,179 3.84 3.86 0.50
CARREFOUR 
SUPERMARCHE 132,166 2,726.3 20,628 4.07 3.91 22,275 2.11 2.72 0.08
CREDIT AGRICOLE 144,184 2,074.5 14,388 3.73 4.66 29,979 2.48 5.59 0.14
DAIMLER 173,898 8,531.9 49,063 5.94 10.72 170,043 5.87 4.97 0.20
DEUTSCHE BANK 189,235 8,416.7 44,478 11.56 14.13 226,700 4.66 3.20 0.27
DEUTSCHE BOERSE 96,267 3,532.2 36,691 1.06 2.97 14,754 3.80 4.51 0.04
DEUTSCHE TELEKOM 103,617 7,702.1 74,332 9.10 7.13 141,996 8.44 5.09 0.18
E.ON 172,070 8,778.9 51,019 8.24 13.48 466,167 12.47 8.38 0.53
ENEL 133,043 4,158.2 31,254 1.95 1.61 207,925 43.90 54.79 0.50
ENI 171,544 5,969.3 34,798 0.73 0.56 20,379 9.17 6.36 0.03
FORTIS      230,052 5,672.3 24,656 16.51 7.92 488,988 8.70 6.25 0.86
FRANCE TELECOM 210,668 5,190.2 24,637 6.16 4.55 121,109 5.36 5.43 0.23
GRP DANONE 170,115 3,192.2 18,765 0.39 0.31 21,806 18.28 19.59 0.07
GRP SOCIETE 
GENERALE 246,933 6,323.9 25,610 2.01 1.57 161,869 18.32 14.31 0.26
IBERDROLA 98,281 4,285.8 43,608 0.16 0.39 8,396 15.49 25.67 0.02
ING GROEP 183,835 5,913.2 32,166 3.83 1.76 224,677 21.85 10.60 0.38
INTESA SANPAOLO 119,681 4,805.5 40,153 0.49 0.17 20,275 25.66 11.56 0.04
L'OREAL 137,517 2,327.6 16,926 3.72 4.35 27,480 2.48 4.30 0.12
LVMH MOET 
HENNESSY 150,690 2,710.5 17,987 3.73 4.44 26,264 2.13 3.60 0.10
MUENCHENER RUECK 120,327 4,607.9 38,295 9.58 8.82 88,364 3.99 2.64 0.19
NOKIA 179,301 9,235.7 51,509 2.39 3.11 167,993 17.05 10.57 0.18
PHILIPS ELECTRONICS 202,630 5,368.0 26,492 11.32 6.29 286,566 8.03 5.73 0.53
RENAULT 171,747 3,104.4 18,075 3.75 4.68 38,316 2.65 4.46 0.12
REPSOL YPF 95,611 2,631.3 27,521 0.30 1.05 57,300 44.38 118.40 0.22
RWE 132,587 5,712.3 43,083 5.00 8.56 75,185 4.18 3.99 0.13
SAINT GOBAIN 158,017 2,521.0 15,954 5.25 5.83 73,193 4.18 7.47 0.29
SANOFI-AVENTIS 209,655 6,004.3 28,639 6.10 5.22 95,685 4.03 3.46 0.16
SAP 118,283 4,972.4 42,038 4.81 6.23 115,952 8.88 6.51 0.23
SCHNEIDER ELECTRIC 147,489 2,321.4 15,739 3.84 4.99 24,692 1.90 3.78 0.11
SIEMENS 190,914 10,639.8 55,731 7.43 11.92 478,100 12.94 8.29 0.45
SUEZ 194,471 4,723.2 24,287 8.00 7.06 146,770 5.01 5.14 0.31
TELECOM ITALIA 100,334 3,790.0 37,774 0.60 0.80 16,924 12.08 12.75 0.04
TELEFONICA 171,690 8,535.1 49,712 4.14 8.27 109,178 5.12 7.19 0.13
TOTAL 320,685 10,773.7 33,596 14.24 10.40 514,131 6.50 4.22 0.48
UNICREDITO ITALIANO 215,043 11,573.4 53,819 1.29 0.85 110,155 23.98 13.14 0.10
UNILEVER NV 184,066 4,809.7 26,130 10.33 5.03 260,660 9.22 5.92 0.54
VINCI 193,968 2,890.0 14,899 5.46 3.90 122,639 6.75 12.18 0.42
VIVENDI 162,783 3,092.6 18,998 4.87 5.32 67,594 4.08 5.21 0.22
VOLKSWAGEN 117,850 4,221.5 35,821 9.02 9.03 86,120 4.05 2.97 0.20
ALL INSTRUMENTS 8,010,905 262,313.9 32,745 6.71 6.45 9,502,869 9.01 7.54 0.36  30 
Table 11 – Summary statistics trade-throughs for all instruments (cost scenario 1) 
 
Instrument
Number of 
Trades
Value [€ 
mn]
Avg. value 
per trade 
[€] 
% full 
trade 
through
% partial 
trade 
through
Savings [€]
Avg. 
savings per 
trade 
through [€]
Savings / 
trade 
through 
value [bps]
Savings / 
trade value 
[bps]
AEGON            125,881 2,397.4 19,045 14.16 5.88 297,277 11.79 10.05 1.24
AIR LIQUIDE 137,656 1,960.0 14,238 5.17 2.24 23,684 2.32 3.16 0.12
ALCATEL LUCENT 117,490 1,730.5 14,729 8.00 6.13 118,108 7.12 14.80 0.68
ALLIANZ  190,387 8,673.0 45,555 12.74 11.43 278,923 6.06 3.58 0.32
ASSICURAZIONI 
GENERALI 112,315 2,984.2 26,570 0.17 0.10 2,898 9.57 5.34 0.01
AXA 208,272 5,143.0 24,694 11.41 8.82 887,923 21.07 18.87 1.73
BCO SANTANDER 165,497 11,024.8 66,616 11.42 21.96 2,060,041 37.28 33.00 1.87
BASF 131,899 5,487.2 41,602 7.30 6.96 87,109 4.63 2.95 0.16
BAYER 135,287 5,912.6 43,704 6.12 7.45 114,547 6.24 4.29 0.19
BCO BILBAO VIZCAYA 
ARGENT 137,718 6,415.8 46,587 0.55 0.92 23,214 11.48 11.72 0.04
BNP PARIBAS 297,256 6,746.5 22,696 16.30 10.63 370,445 4.63 4.32 0.55
CARREFOUR 
SUPERMARCHE 132,166 2,726.3 20,628 4.04 2.22 25,576 3.09 3.24 0.09
CREDIT AGRICOLE 144,184 2,074.5 14,388 3.72 3.13 32,253 3.27 6.22 0.16
DAIMLER AG 173,898 8,531.9 49,063 5.81 7.66 172,350 7.36 5.16 0.20
DEUTSCHE BANK 189,235 8,416.7 44,478 11.22 13.16 233,366 5.06 3.32 0.28
DEUTSCHE BOERSE 96,267 3,532.2 36,691 1.05 1.67 14,543 5.57 4.62 0.04
DEUTSCHE TELEKOM 103,617 7,702.1 74,332 8.91 5.43 146,336 9.85 5.26 0.19
E.ON 172,070 8,778.9 51,019 8.04 11.96 466,985 13.57 8.52 0.53
ENEL 133,043 4,158.2 31,254 1.71 1.19 203,547 52.80 54.69 0.49
ENI 171,544 5,969.3 34,798 0.64 0.37 18,450 10.68 5.87 0.03
FORTIS 230,052 5,672.3 24,656 16.37 6.88 493,020 9.22 6.32 0.87
FRANCE TELECOM 210,668 5,190.2 24,637 6.10 3.80 120,681 5.78 5.46 0.23
GROUPE DANONE 170,115 3,192.2 18,765 0.39 0.31 21,462 18.03 19.31 0.07
GROUPE SOCIETE 
GENERALE 246,933 6,323.9 25,610 1.99 1.31 165,841 20.37 14.72 0.26
IBERDROLA 98,281 4,285.8 43,608 0.16 0.34 8,330 16.66 25.81 0.02
ING GROEP 183,835 5,913.2 32,166 3.80 1.32 228,921 24.29 10.83 0.39
INTESA SANPAOLO 119,681 4,805.5 40,153 0.46 0.17 19,107 25.44 10.90 0.04
L'OREAL 137,517 2,327.6 16,926 3.67 2.61 29,483 3.41 5.28 0.13
LVMH MOET 
HENNESSY 150,690 2,710.5 17,987 3.68 3.07 28,813 2.83 4.32 0.11
MUENCHENER RUECK 120,327 4,607.9 38,295 9.38 7.58 94,664 4.64 2.88 0.21
NOKIA 179,301 9,235.7 51,509 2.34 2.51 169,307 19.47 10.72 0.18
PHILIPS ELECTRONICS 202,630 5,368.0 26,492 11.19 5.65 302,295 8.86 6.07 0.56
RENAULT 171,747 3,104.4 18,075 3.70 2.81 41,227 3.69 5.32 0.13
REPSOL YPF 95,611 2,631.3 27,521 0.30 0.89 57,602 50.44 122.22 0.22
RWE 132,587 5,712.3 43,083 4.87 6.22 76,021 5.17 4.22 0.13
SAINT GOBAIN 158,017 2,521.0 15,954 5.21 4.25 75,026 5.02 8.17 0.30
SANOFI-AVENTIS 209,655 6,004.3 28,639 6.04 3.76 103,549 5.04 3.82 0.17
SAP 118,283 4,972.4 42,038 4.75 5.05 116,913 10.08 6.62 0.24
SCHNEIDER ELECTRIC 147,489 2,321.4 15,739 3.76 3.08 26,252 2.60 4.45 0.11
SIEMENS 190,914 10,639.8 55,731 7.31 10.17 479,086 14.36 8.40 0.45
SUEZ 194,471 4,723.2 24,287 7.96 4.59 145,004 5.94 5.22 0.31
TELECOM ITALIA 100,334 3,790.0 37,774 0.50 0.67 15,566 13.29 11.79 0.04
TELEFONICA 171,690 8,535.1 49,712 3.59 6.16 112,267 6.71 7.46 0.13
TOTAL 320,685 10,773.7 33,596 14.05 9.26 533,651 7.14 4.41 0.50
UNICREDITO ITALIANO 215,043 11,573.4 53,819 1.17 0.71 105,221 26.03 12.59 0.09
UNILEVER NV 184,066 4,809.7 26,130 10.25 4.36 272,291 10.12 6.21 0.57
VINCI 193,968 2,890.0 14,899 5.42 2.94 128,389 7.92 13.07 0.44
VIVENDI 162,783 3,092.6 18,998 4.81 3.69 72,510 5.24 5.72 0.23
VOLKSWAGEN 117,850 4,221.5 35,821 8.84 7.30 89,792 4.72 3.18 0.21
ALL INSTRUMENTS 8,010,905 262,313.9 32,745 6.58 5.29 9,709,864 10.21 7.80 0.37  31 
Table 12 – Summary statistics trade-throughs for all instruments (cost scenario 2) 
 
Instrument
Number 
of trades
Value [€ 
mn]
Value per 
trade [€]
% full 
trade 
through
% partial 
trade 
through
Savings 
[€]
Avg. 
savings 
per trade 
through 
[€]
Savings / 
trade 
through 
value 
[bps]
Savings / 
trade 
value 
[bps]
AEGON 125,881 2,397.4 19,045 4.98 2.99 174,743 17.42 8.22 0.73
AIR LIQUIDE     137,656 1,960.0 14,238 0.23 0.15 4,745 9.02 5.20 0.02
ALCATEL LUCENT 117,490 1,730.5 14,729 2.02 1.67 54,345 12.51 9.62 0.31
ALLIANZ 190,387 8,673.0 45,555 2.12 2.28 147,903 17.65 5.16 0.17
ASSICURAZIONI 
GENERALI 112,315 2,984.2 26,570 0.03 0.00 491 14.89 2.78 0.00
AXA 208,272 5,143.0 24,694 3.15 4.63 694,500 42.88 27.41 1.35
BASF 131,899 5,487.2 41,602 1.02 1.23 39,492 13.28 4.15 0.07
BAYER 135,287 5,912.6 43,704 1.17 1.76 59,301 14.95 5.79 0.10
BCO BILBAO 
VIZCAYA ARGENT 137,718 6,415.8 46,587 0.05 0.06 4,418 30.47 8.67 0.01
BCO SANTANDER 165,497 11,024.8 66,616 3.42 4.23 1,270,991 100.39 28.52 1.15
BNP PARIBAS 297,256 6,746.5 22,696 2.24 1.85 337,179 27.75 13.13 0.50
CARREFOUR 
SUPERMARCHE 132,166 2,726.3 20,628 0.28 0.23 5,691 8.46 4.24 0.02
CREDIT AGRICOLE 144,184 2,074.5 14,388 0.27 0.37 6,757 7.33 6.50 0.03
DAIMLER 173,898 8,531.9 49,063 1.34 1.79 100,490 18.48 6.73 0.12
DEUTSCHE BANK 189,235 8,416.7 44,478 1.69 2.70 93,240 11.25 4.14 0.11
DEUTSCHE BOERSE 96,267 3,532.2 36,691 0.24 0.27 7,395 15.09 5.98 0.02
DEUTSCHE 
TELEKOM 103,617 7,702.1 74,332 2.63 2.14 94,644 19.18 3.94 0.12
E.ON 172,070 8,778.9 51,019 1.91 5.67 341,883 26.22 14.09 0.39
ENEL 133,043 4,158.2 31,254 0.65 0.30 167,364 132.41 76.70 0.40
ENI 171,544 5,969.3 34,798 0.09 0.02 7,013 36.52 5.61 0.01
FORTIS      230,052 5,672.3 24,656 5.67 2.37 254,053 13.73 4.66 0.45
FRANCE TELECOM 210,668 5,190.2 24,637 1.10 0.83 60,512 14.87 6.08 0.12
GRP DANONE 170,115 3,192.2 18,765 0.18 0.20 14,976 22.97 19.59 0.05
GRP SOCIETE 
GENERALE 246,933 6,323.9 25,610 0.81 0.50 129,124 40.03 15.93 0.20
IBERDROLA 98,281 4,285.8 43,608 0.04 0.02 5,482 89.86 39.22 0.01
ING GROEP 183,835 5,913.2 32,166 2.31 0.81 174,931 30.53 9.21 0.30
INTESA SANPAOLO 119,681 4,805.5 40,153 0.21 0.02 10,510 38.92 7.30 0.02
L'OREAL 137,517 2,327.6 16,926 0.29 0.25 12,136 16.31 13.30 0.05
LVMH MOET 
HENNESSY 150,690 2,710.5 17,987 0.26 0.24 8,637 11.58 6.65 0.03
MUENCHENER 
RUECK 120,327 4,607.9 38,295 1.30 1.25 40,490 13.20 4.28 0.09
NOKIA 179,301 9,235.7 51,509 0.53 0.31 89,960 59.85 9.65 0.10
PHILIPS 
ELECTRONICS 202,630 5,368.0 26,492 2.74 1.88 161,579 17.27 6.54 0.30
RENAULT 171,747 3,104.4 18,075 0.31 0.43 16,703 13.25 10.92 0.05
REPSOL YPF 95,611 2,631.3 27,521 0.04 0.34 43,215 118.40 452.46 0.16
RWE 132,587 5,712.3 43,083 0.67 1.26 40,056 15.65 7.53 0.07
SAINT GOBAIN 158,017 2,521.0 15,954 0.56 0.97 33,764 14.02 15.43 0.13
SANOFI-AVENTIS 209,655 6,004.3 28,639 0.89 0.62 40,238 12.71 4.53 0.07
SAP 118,283 4,972.4 42,038 1.47 1.93 72,698 18.10 7.05 0.15
SCHNEIDER 
ELECTRIC 147,489 2,321.4 15,739 0.28 0.23 6,288 8.24 6.46 0.03
SIEMENS 190,914 10,639.8 55,731 2.60 4.11 350,163 27.35 10.10 0.33
SUEZ 194,471 4,723.2 24,287 1.43 0.84 70,545 16.03 5.65 0.15
TELECOM ITALIA 100,334 3,790.0 37,774 0.09 0.02 6,885 59.87 8.93 0.02
TELEFONICA 171,690 8,535.1 49,712 0.31 0.16 25,750 31.79 5.49 0.03
TOTAL 320,685 10,773.7 33,596 2.85 2.41 252,965 14.99 5.02 0.23
UNICREDITO 
ITALIANO 215,043 11,573.4 53,819 0.30 0.12 63,467 70.68 11.21 0.05
UNILEVER NV 184,066 4,809.7 26,130 2.90 1.39 154,989 19.62 6.32 0.32
VINCI 193,968 2,890.0 14,899 0.53 0.77 82,962 32.90 35.53 0.29
VIVENDI 162,783 3,092.6 18,998 0.81 0.66 28,666 11.97 5.89 0.09
VOLKSWAGEN 117,850 4,221.5 35,821 0.94 1.11 44,017 18.19 6.82 0.10
ALL INSTRUMENTS 8,010,905 262,313.9 32,745 1.41 1.34 5,908,346 26.83 10.17 0.23  32 
Table 13 – Results for TOTAL from the gross perspective 
 
Table 14 – Results for TOTAL in cost scenario 1 
 
Table 15 – Results for TOTAL in cost scenario 2 
 
   Euronext FR Chi-X Euronext BR Milan SWX Europe Overall
Number  of trades 293,729 26,263 465 210 18 320,685
Volume [shares]  183,140,456 8,060,835 85,240 30,682 211,050 191,528,263
Value [€]  10,299,568,394 455,750,908 4,787,262 1,715,115 11,859,899 10,773,681,578
Avg. volume per trade [shares]  624 307 183 146 11,725 597.2
Avg. value per trade [€]  35,065 17,353 10,295 8,167 658,883 33,595.8
Percentage full trade through 14.58 9.52 53.98 53.33 5.56 14.24
Percentage partial trade through 10.88 5.24 4.95 1.90 5.56 10.40
Number of trade throughs 74,778 3,875 274 116 2 79,045
Full 42,815 2,499 251 112 1 45,678
Partial 31,963 1,376 23 4 1 33,367
Savings [€]  493,219 16,679 3,360 542 331 514,131
Avg. savings per trade through [€] 6.60 4.30 12.26 4.67 165.64 6.50
Savings / trade through value [bps] 4.23 3.33 12.73 8.28 51.19 4.22
Savings / trade value [bps] 0.48 0.37 7.02 3.16 0.28 0.48
   Euronext FR Chi-X Euronext BR Milan SWX Europe Overall
Number  of trades 293,729 26,263 465 210 18 320,685
Volume [shares]  183,140,456 8,060,835 85,240 30,682 211,050 191,528,263
Value [€]  10,299,568,394 455,750,908 4,787,262 1,715,115 11,859,899 10,773,681,578
Avg. volume per trade [shares]  624 307 183 146 11,725 597.2
Avg. value per trade [€]  35,065 17,353 10,295 8,167 658,883 33,595.8
Percentage full trade through 14.51 8.06 53.76 35.24 5.56 14.05
Percentage partial trade through 9.82 3.16 4.52 0.95 5.56 9.26
Number of trade throughs 71,465 2,946 271 76 2 74,760
Full 42,608 2,116 250 74 1 45,049
Partial 28,857 830 21 2 1 29,711
Savings [€]  516,314 13,114 3,429 464 330 533,651
Avg. savings per trade through [€] 7.22 4.45 12.65 6.10 165.20 7.14
Savings / trade through value [bps] 4.45 2.78 13.05 7.66 51.05 4.41
Savings / trade value [bps] 0.50 0.29 7.16 2.70 0.28 0.50
   Euronext FR Chi-X Euronext BR Milan SWX Europe Overall
Number  of trades 293,729 26,263 465 210 18 320,685
Volume [shares]  183,140,456 8,060,835 85,240 30,682 211,050 191,528,263
Value [€]  10,299,568,394 455,750,908 4,787,262 1,715,115 11,859,899 10,773,681,578
Avg. volume per trade [shares]  623.5 306.9 183.3 146.1 11,725.0 597.2
Avg. value per trade [€]  35,064.9 17,353.3 10,295.2 8,167.2 658,883.3 33,595.8
Percentage full trade through 2.98 1.07 20.43 1.90 0.00 2.85
Percentage partial trade through 2.58 0.61 1.94 0.48 5.56 2.41
Number of trade throughs 16,324 440 104 5 1 16,874
Full 8,752 280 95 4 0 9,131
Partial 7,572 160 9 1 1 7,743
Savings [€]  245,661 4,728 2,243 45 287 252,965
Avg. savings per trade through [€] 15.05 10.75 21.57 8.99 287.34 14.99
Savings / trade through value [bps] 5.01 4.45 12.17 2.67 51.08 5.02
Savings / trade value [bps] 0.24 0.10 4.69 0.26 0.24 0.23  33 
Table 16 – Test results for TOTAL in cost scenario 2 
 
Table 17 – Test results for AXA in cost scenario 2 
 
 
 
TOTAL       Euronext FR Chi-x Euronext BR Milan SWX Europe
# obs. 74778 3875 274 116 2
Mean Costs 17.4354 17.3304 37.8679 642.9350 13.0634
t-value -790.0000 -270.0000 -36.9296 -1100.0000 -0.0292
Mean Costs 7.0837 8.4424 7.117703*** 25.9103 22.3854
t-value -9.9816 -34.1718 2.9928 -28.9709 0.9923
PI (bps) Ho: Mean PI < 
Mean Costs, Ha: Mean PI > 
Mean Costs
Savings (€) Ho: Mean 
Savings < Mean Costs, Ha: 
Mean Savings > Mean 
Costs
AXA Euronext FR Chi-X Euronext NL Milan SWX Europe
# obs. 41725 2432 11 266 3
Mean Costs 30.3804 63.8241 502.4863 659.7641 18.6915
t-value -57.0684 -30.3345 -19.0531 -250.0000 1.3282
Mean Costs 7.16531*** 8.329631*** 7.106193** 26.1118 22.4315
t-value 39.6281 10.5609 1.8687 -19.9199 1.0213
PI (bps) Ho: Mean PI < 
Mean Costs, Ha: Mean PI > 
Mean Costs
Savings (€) Ho: Mean 
Savings < Mean Costs, Ha: 
Mean Savings > Mean 
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